M. Guizot reverts to the earlier periods of these transactions and admits that from the outset, the King of the French spontaneously made known that he did not pretend to obtain the hand of the Queen of Spain for any of his sons, and that he wished the Queen of Spain to choose her consort from among the Descendants of Philip the Fifth, a category which, as the French Government pointed out at the time, specifically excluded all the members of the Royal family of France. But surely these declarations had reference to a principle, and not simply to a person. The objection, of which His Majesty the King of the French by such declarations admitted the validity, was not that one of this sons should be the husband of Isabella of Bourbon, but that one of his sons should be the husband of the Queen of Spain; and the principle of that objection is therefore not confined in its application to a marriage of one of his sons with the reigning sovereign but evidently applies also to a marriage with the immediate heiress of the Crown. And is this the doctrine of Her Majesty's Government alone? And is it only now for the first time advanced? Far otherwise. It is a doctrine admitted virtually by His Majesty the King of the French himself and at an antecedent period. For M. Guizot alludes in his Despatch to certain engagements from which the French Government intimated on the 27th of February 1846 that they should in a specified contingency consider themselves freed and released . And what were those engagements? They were first the engagement, originally and spontaneously made by H.M. the King of the French, that no son of his should marry the Queen of Spain; and, secondly, the engagement also spontaneously taken by H.M. and by his Minister, in September 1845 at Eu, that in no case should the Duke of Montpensier marry the Infanta, until the Queen of Spain should have married, and until by her having had children, the prospect of a direct succession to the Spanish Crown should have been assured. Does not the second of these engagements prove that the first was understood by those who made it, exactly in the sense which I have given to it, and that the objection of which the King of the French acknowledged the force and justice was not that one of his sons should marry a particular princess of the House of Bourbon, but that any of his sons should be the consort of the Queen of Spain? And H.M. feeling and admitting the force of that objection, proposed of his own accord that the marriage which he wished to take place between his son and the Infanta should be postponed until the birth of children to the Queen should in some degree have divested that marriage Of the appearance of an attempt to take the chance of attaining by indirect means in one way, that which had been relinquished, directly, in another.

Thus M. Guizot denies that the Treaty and the renunciations of Utrecht afford to the British Government any ground of right for protesting against the marriage of the Duke of Montpensier and against its possible consequences. Now the British Government have protested against that marriage as variance with the spirit of the Treaty of Utrecht, and against certain contingent consequences of that marriage as a violation of the letter of that Treaty and Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that their protest rests upon good and sufficient grounds.

M. Guizot says that the Treaty of Utrecht had a double object. The first, to secure the Crown of Spain to Philip V' and his descendants. The second, to prevent the possibility of a union of the crowns of France and Spain on one and the same head.

Now, the first of these results was undoubtedly the effect, but is no where put forth as one of the objects of the Treaty, and the second was a means and not an end. The main and real object of the Treaty, besides the restoration of peace between the contracting parties, was that for which the preceding war had been undertaken, and it is truly set forth in the second article of the Treaty between Great Britain and Spain………………… . It was a too close and intimate union between the Kingdoms of France and of Spain which constituted that danger to the balance of power in Europe which it was the real object of the war of Succession and of the transactions of Utrecht for ever afterwards to avert, and the means by which that too close and intimate union was to he prevented were the perpetual separation of the two Crowns, and the perpetual exclusion of any Prince of the Royal family of one of the two countries, or of any of the descendants of such Prince, from succeeding to the throne of the other.

Her Majesty's Government therefore contend that the marriage of the Duke of Montpensier to the Infanta is at variance with the main object of the Treaty and that the letter and positive stipulations of the Treaty would prevent any of the descendants or that Prince from succeeding to the throne of Spain "whatever might be the manner in which the succession might devolve upon their line. "

The French Government do not pretend to deny the validity of the renunciations of Utrecht. Those renunciations were clear, positive, explicit, and comprehensive. They were incorporated in the Treaty, and were made part of the law both of France and of Spain. And the King of France engaged, by the stipulations of the Treaty " solennellement et par parole de Roi " that neither he nor his heirs and successors " ne feront jamais rien, ni ne permettront que jamais il soit rien fait capable d'empêcher les renonciations et autres transactions susdites d'avoir leur plein et entier effet" but that on the contrary "they would take sincere care and exert themselves, afin que rien ne donne atteinte à ce fondement du salut public, ni ne puisse l'ébranler."

Her Majesty's Government are surprised that in the face of such renunciations and of such stipulations and engagements, the French Government should endeavour to represent, as is implied, though not directly asserted, in M. Guizot's Despatch, that the descendants of the Duke of Montpensier could relieve themselves from the positive and perpetual exclusion which attaches to them from the transactions or Utrecht, by the plea that they would inherit rights from the Infanta Luisa Fernanda.

It is manifest that no claim transmitted to them by the Infanta could counterbalance or set aside the positive disqualification which they will inherit from the Duke of Montpensier. Nothing is more common than that the disqualification inherited by children from one of their parents, overrides the qualification which they inherit from the other.

But if there were any value in this implied assertion or the French Government, and if the marriage of the Duke of Montpensier with the Infanta would really free his descendants from the disabling effects of the renunciations of Utrecht, how could the conclusion or that marriage be reconciled with the above quoted engagement of the Crown of France, solemnly taken "et par parole de Roi" never to do, nor to permit to be done any thing which could be capable of preventing those renunciations "from having their full and entire effect."

The French Government therefore must either admit the descendants of the Duke of Montpensier are excluded by virtue of the renunciations in the Treaty of Utrecht, or they must acknowledge that they have violated the engagement contained in that Treaty

M. Guizot however quotes instances of marriages of two Princes of Spain with Princesses of France, and of a Prince of France with a Princess of Spain, and he says that the last instance is remarkable, because it was the heir to the Crown of France who married one of the heiresses of the Crown of Spain.

To these instances Her Majesty's Government would reply that even if they were cases in which the stipulations or Utrecht had been overlooked, the fact of their having been so overlooked by statesmen in the last century would be no reason why they should not be appealed to and observed by statesmen in the present century, if those stipulations are in themselves clear, positive and indisputable.

Doubtful stipulations may receive an interpretation from precedents, but a Treaty that is plain and precise can only be invalidated by an act as formal as itself. A law is not abrogated for one man, because another man has abstained from appealing to its enactments, and a Treaty is not annulled for one generation because another generation under circumstances essentially different, may have allowed his stipulations to lie dormant. But the cases quoted by M. Guizot ire very different from that of the marriage of the Duke of Montpensier.

In all these cases the Salic law was in force both in France and in Spain, the Princesses in question, instead of being immediate heiresses to the Crown of the country to the Royal Family of which they respectively belonged were, in the two first instances, by the law of France altogether excluded, and, in the third instance, by the law of Spain, excluded until all male heirs should be extinct It is obvious that, while the Salic law was in force in both countries, the strict enforcement of the stipulations of Utrecht in regard to females might well be considered as less important than it has now become, since the change which has of late years been made in the law of succession in Spain. But with respect to the cases quoted it may be observed as to the first, that after that marriage, the treaty between Spain and Austria in 1725 still further confirmed and recorded the exclusion of all French Princes and their descendants from the throne of Spain and with respect to the third, that no descendants of that marriage have succeeded or have claimed a right to succeed to the Spanish Crown.

M. Guizot indeed says that the stipulations of Utrecht will suffice for the future, as they have done for the past for the interests of peace, and for the balance or power in Europe.

If Her Majesty's Government are to understand by that sentence that where as no French Prince or his descendant has, since the Treaty of Utrecht, claimed to succeed to the throne of Spain, no French Prince or his descendant will ever claim so to succeed in future, Her Majesty's Government would admit that the question at issue between the two Governments was divested of much of its practical importance.

Her Majesty's Government however cannot admit that the experience of the past, as asserted by M. Guizot, has demonstrated that foreign influence has no power of swaying the international policy or Spain. On the contrary, the history of the last century affords many examples to show how, in consequence of that intimate connection which, not withstanding the Treaty of Utrecht, continued to subsist between the Crowns of France and Spain, Spain followed France into war, and made peace only when France did so too.

It is true indeed, as M. Guizot reminds Her Majesty's Government, that in the present century Spain made a great and a successful effort to vindicate her national independence, and it may be remarked that the unanimity of feeling which then crowned her exertions with success was much strengthened by the deep impression produced throughout Spain by the secrecy and surprise with which lose proceedings were conducted which were intended to lead to the establishment of a French Prince on the Spanish throne.

The British Government has not, as M. Guizot seems to suppose, forgot those events, nor does it fail to render justice to the patriotism then displayed by the Spanish nation and Her Majesty's Government are convinced that, on any analogous occasion, the same spirit would animate the whole Spanish people. But Her Majesty's Government would deeply lament that any such occasion should arise again to let loose on the Peninsula a tempest of angry passions, and again to pour forth on the soil of Spain a deluge of human blood.

[Published in Documents Communiqués aux Chambres dans la Session de 1846-1847, Par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, extracted from French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Diplomatic Correspondence, Espagne, Vol 828, pp. 113 r - 126 r].

Mr Guizot adverts to the Treaty of Utrecht and contends that, although that Treaty prevents the union of the Crowns of France and Spain upon one head, it does not interdict marriages between the Royal Houses of France and Spain. And he again quotes certain cases of such marriages in the eighteenth century, in proof of his assertion.

But Mr Guizot does not deal at all will the position laid down by Her Majesty's Government; he asserts that which Her Majesty's Government have never denied; but he does not deny that which Her Majesty's Government have asserted. He says that the Treaty or Utrecht does not interdict certain marriages, but he does not deny that the Descendants of the Duke of Orleans are excluded from the throne of Spain.

The position laid down by Her Majesty's Government is plain, simple and incontrovertible. It is this the Duke of Orleans of 1712 renounced for himself and all his Descendants all claim or right to succeed to the throne of Spain, and declared himself and his Descendants incapable of and excluded from such succession, whatever might be the way (and this includes the way of marriage) in which the succession might devolve upon their line. That renunciation was embodied in the Treaty of Utrecht, and thereby was made binding on France, and became part of the public law of Europe and it was moreover incorporated in the law both or France and of Spain.

The Duke of Montpensier is and his children will be Descendants of the Duke of Orleans of 1712 and the Duke of Montpensier and his children are therefore incapable of succeeding to the throne of Spain "whatever may be the way in which that succession may devolve upon them. "

This is the position of Her Majesty's Government. It is founded upon the plain and positive letter of treaties and of laws, and it cannot be shaken by quoting marriages which took place a century ago. None of these cases were similar to that which is the subject of the present discussion, for in none of them did a French Prince marry the heiress presumptive to the throne of Spain. In all those cases the Salic law was in existence both in France and in Spain; and when the Infanta Maria Theresa married the Dauphin in 1745, there were several male Heirs to the Crown of Spain.

But Mr Guizot, between the doctrines which he has laid down and the examples which he has quoted, seems to have involved himself in difficulties from which it is not easy for him to escape lie admits that the Treaty of Utrecht absolutely prevents the union of the Crowns of France and or Spain upon one and the same head; but he asserts that, in all the cases which lie has quoted, the Spanish Infantas, when they married French Princes, brought with them an eventual but a positive right to the Crown of Spain, and he further says that the Infanta Maria Theresa Antoinette, who, in 1745, married the Dauphin, son of Louis XV, was one of the Heirs to the Spanish Crown.

Now, supposing that to have happened which might have come to pass, namely that all the persons who stood before that Infanta in regard to their right of succession to the Crown of Spain, had died during her lire time; and supposing that her husband, the Dauphin had succeeded to the Crown of France could she have been at one and the same time Queen of both countries? And if under those circumstances she had had one only child and that child, a son, could that son have become King both of France and of Spain? It is obvious that in such a case one or other

of Mr Guizot's conflicting doctrines must have given way; and that either the prohibition which the Treaty of Utrecht contains against the Union of the two Crowns on one and the same head must have been broken through; or else the positive though eventual right of succession to the Crown of Spain which Mr Guizot asserts that a Spanish Infanta brings with her in a marriage with a French prince must have been given up.

But, it is obvious that in such a case, the treaty prohibition must have prevailed and so, in the present case, Her Majesty's Government contends that the stipulations and renunciations of the Treaty of Utrecht are stronger and more powerful than any personal claims.

But, as I have said, none of the cases quoted by Mr Guizot were similar to that which is now under discussion; and even if they had been so they would have been unavailing for the purpose for which they were quoted, because though precedents may serve for the interpretation of doubtful and ambiguous stipulations, they never can set aside stipulations which, like those: of the Treaty of Utrecht, are clear, positive and incapable of being misunderstood, and the omissions of Governments in the last century cannot bar the Treaty rights of Governments in the present day. But if there did prevail between the Governments of France and Spain, during the last century, a union more close and intimate than was consistent with the spirit and intentions of the Treaties of Utrecht, as recorded in the second article of the Treaty between England and Spain, may not that circumstance be in a great degree ascribed to the marriages quoted by Mr Guizot? And may not those historical examples serve therefore as useful illustrations of the soundness of the principle upon which, in my Despatch of the 22nd of September, I stated that Her Majesty's Government protested against the marriage of the Duke of Montpensier to the Infanta as tending to affect injuriously the balance of power in Europe by establishing too intimate a connection between the Governments of France and of Spain? And Mr Guizot most assuredly does not forget that in the hundred years which preceded the Treaty of Utrecht, twice did it happen that a Spanish Princess was married to a French Prince, and that, on each of those occasions, that principle of European balance was acknowledged by formal and publicly recorded acts.

Mr Guizot says that by the Treaty or Utrecht, all parties abated somewhat of the pretensions which they had insisted upon at the commencement of the war to which that Treaty put an end.

This statement is, no doubt, true, but it has no bearing on the present discussion Her Majesty's Government are not renewing the pretensions which were abandoned by Great Britain, by the Treaties of Utrecht; they are only claiming the benefit of the securities which were given in those Treaties by France and by Spain. Mr Guizot says that England and her allies acknowledged by those Treaties the establishment of a Branch of the House of Bourbon upon the throne of Spain; Her Majesty's Government do not seek to revoke that acknowledgement; but Mr Guizot admits that by those Treaties Louis XIV consent to the complete separation of the Rights of the Royal Houses of France and Spain; and it is on the maintenance of that complete separation that Her Majesty's Government insist.

It is on "the definitive conditions of that peace" that Her Majesty's Government, in this discussion, have taken their stand; and it is "the letter and the spirit" of that Treaty of which they deem themselves entitled to claim the faithful observance.

[Published in Documents Communiqués aux Chambres dans la Session de 1846-1847, Par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, extracted from French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Diplomatic Correspondence, Espagne, Vol 828, pp. 138 r - 146 v].

"XII. . Dans le paragraphe 22 et dans les dix paragraphes 1 suivants, Lord Palmerston reprend et discute de nouveau la question du traité d'Utrecht. Je retrouve là les mêmes idées, les mêmes méprises que j'aï déjà, combattues quant au sens et aux conséquences de ce traité. Je ne crois pas nécessaire de recommencer cette discussion; je me bornerai à quelques courtes remarqués, sur 1es assertions de Lord Palmerston qui me paraissent jeter dans la question le plus de confusion et d' erreur.

Dans sa dépêche du 22 septembre, c'était contre lé mariage même de M. le Duc de

Montpensier avec l'Infante que Lord Palmerston protestait formellement au nom de traité d'Utrecht. Aujourd'hui, il reconnaît que le traité d'Utrecht n'interdit point un tel mariage. Mais il soutient que les descendants qui en proviendraient seraient, en vertu de ce traité, exclus du trône d'Espagne, et il dit que je n'ai point nié cette assertion.

Je l'ai formellement niée. J'ai reconnu qu'aux termes du traité d'Utrecht et des renonciations de 1712, les descendants du Duc d'Orléans ne pourraient, en cas d'extinction de la lignée de Philippe V, réclamer, du chef de leur ligne, aucuns droits au trône d'Espagne. Mais j'ai soutenu que les descendants de Philippe V ne pouvaient perdre leurs propres droits, les droits de leur propre ligne au trône d'Espagne, pour cause de mariage avec des Princes ou Princesses issus des lignes qui avaient renoncé aux leurs. J'ai établi que tels étaient et le sens primitif et l'interprétation constantee du traité d'Utrecht. J'ai cité plusieurs faits en preuve de cette interprétation. Spécialement, Ferdinand VII, et Isabelle II, Roi et Reine d'Espagne comme descendants de Philippe V, bien qu'ils fussent, par leu mère et grand mère, descendants directs de Louis XV. J'ai demandé à Lord Palmerston s'il avait jamais songé à douter du droit de Ferdinand VII et Isabelle II. Il ne répond point à cet exemple.

La pensée du traité d'Utrecht a été je le répète, d'empècher l'ùnion des deux Couronnes de France et d'Espagne sur une même tête. Si donc il arraivait un jour, comme Lord Palmerston en présente l'hypothèse, que les droits à l'une et à l'autre Couronne se trouvassent réunis sur la tête d'un seul Prince, je n'hésite pas à reconnaître qu'il ne pourrait les recueillir toutes deux. Mais tant que les deux lignes des Bourbons de France, et des Bourbons d'Espagne subsistent, les mariages survenus entre elles ne sauraient faire que les propres droîts de l'une de ces lignes soient détruits par l'abandon que l'autre ligne a fait jadis des siens. On peut renoncer, pour soi-même et pour ses descendants aux droits qu'on possède et qu'on leur transmettrait. Mais renoncer, pour ses descendants à des droits qu'on ne possède point, et qu'on ne peut leur transmettre, cela n'est pas admissible. Lord Palmerston méconnaît constamment cette distinction des lignes Royales et des droits qui appartiennent à chacune d'elles et qui demeurent toujours distincts. De là dérivent les fausses consequences qu'il tire du traité d'Utrecht, et qui porteraient à ce traité même et à l'équilibre Européen, qu'i1 a fondé, les attein tes les plus graves.

[Published in Documents Communiqués aux Chambres dans la Session de 1846-1847, Par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, extracted from French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Diplomatic Correspondence, Espagne, Vol 828, pp. 147r - 153v].

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